Under the LR-type fuzzy demand, the cost sharing contract with variable ratio and quality control in the two-stage supply chain are researched. In the condition of disaggregation mode without sharing recall cost, the supply chain members make their effort to insufficient investment, however, they try to make complementation in the central supply chain, and the degree of complementation is increasing with the growing of unit recall cost and total defect rate. Through importing cost sharing contract with the variable ratio, it is found that this contract can exert the manufacturers and suppliers to make their effort to choose the complementary effect, and it exists Nash equilibrium in making effort to choose the game between the two sides. When the defect analysis cost is zero, supply chain members are of incentive compatibility under the contract Φ, and the total profit of supply chain equals to the optimal profit in the central mode. The variable allocation proportion analytic solution and the defect rate threshold value are ensured. Verification results show that the invalid cost index and the invalid quality index of the contract Φ are both lower than the cost-sharing contract with the fixed ratio, and the contract Φ is more reasonable and more effective.