引用本文:陈婉婷,胡志华,俞超.不同政府目标决策下具有奖惩机制的绿色供应链模型[J].控制与决策,2020,35(2):427-435
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不同政府目标决策下具有奖惩机制的绿色供应链模型
陈婉婷1,3, 胡志华2, 俞超1,4
(1. 上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306;2. 上海海事大学物流研究中心,上海201306;3. 海南热带海洋学院海商学院,海南三亚572022;4. 江苏理工学院商学院,江苏常州213001)
摘要:
考虑由一个制造商主导和一个零售商跟随的绿色供应链,产品销售量受价格及节能水平影响.运用Stackelberg博弈理论分别构建无奖惩机制和3种有奖惩机制的博弈模型,得到4种情形下的零售价、批发价、产品需求量、节能水平、政府节能奖惩力度及制造商和零售商利润的均衡解.通过比较分析发现:政府的节能奖惩机制不仅能提高产品节能水平,还可以提升全社会福利水平;政府综合考虑企业收益、消费者福利和环保效益的奖惩机制效果最优;奖惩力度与产品市场规模、环境效益系数和节能水平敏感系数正相关,与制造商节能成本投入系数、政府奖惩机制的成本投入系数、制造商单位生产成本和零售商单位销售成本负相关.最后运用数值分析验证模型的有效性.
关键词:  奖惩机制  绿色供应链  节能水平  Stackelberg博弈
DOI:10.13195/j.kzyjc.2018.0664
分类号:F270.5
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71471109);上海市科学技术委员会基金项目(16040501800);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2018SJA1727).
Green supply chain model with premium and penalty mechanism under different government goals
CHEN Wan-ting1,3,HU Zhi-hua2,YU Chao1,4
(1. School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306,China;2. Logistics Research Center,Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306,China;3. School of Maritime Business,Hainan Tropical Ocean University,Sanya 572022,China;4. School of Business,Jiangsu University of Technology,Changzhou 213001,China)
Abstract:
A green supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and a following retailer is considered, whose product sales are affected by the price and the level of energy saving. Stackelberg game is applied to build a game model without premium and penalty mechanism and with three premium and penalty mechanisms. The equilibrium solutions of the four cases of retail price, wholesale price, product demand, level of energy saving, the level of government energy saving in premium and penalty and manufacturer and retailer profits are obtained. Through comparison and analysis, it is found that the government's energy saving premium and penalty mechanism can not only improve the level of product energy saving, but also improve the level of social welfare; the premium and penalty mechanism that the government takes into consideration the profit of the enterprise, the welfare of the consumer and the benefit of the environmental protection is the best; the level of premium and penalty is positively related to the product market scale, the environmental benefit coefficient and the sensitivity coefficient of energy saving, while negatively related to the cost input coefficient of the manufacturer's energy saving , the cost input coefficient of the government premium and penalty mechanism, unit production cost of the manufacturer and unit sales cost of the retailer. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the models.
Key words:  premium and penaty mechanism  green supply chain  the level of energy saving  Stackelberg game

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