The manufacturer carries out coupon promotion, and the retailers decide whether to provide value-added services to jointly open the BOPS channel. To construct a single Bertrand-Stackelberg game model and a single population retailer symmetry evolutionary game model to analyze the general equilibrium results and the evolutionary stability strategy of the retailer group. It can be found that duopoly retailers under different strategy combinations have the game characteristics of “prisoner's dilemma”, and the manufacturer can dually regulate retailers' pricing behavior and service strategy selection by wholesale pricing and coupon face value. Providing value-added service is the only evolutionary stable strategy for retailer groups, and the change of parameters affects the size of the evolutionary stable area. In the expansion model that introduces the characteristics of price preference, the retailer group will only reach the evolutionary equilibrium of the mixed strategy, and the number of retailers who choose to provide the value-added service strategy in the group always only accounts for a small proportion.