In order to study the evolution mechanism of the probability of inbound bus and bicycle passage under the influence of rider heterogeneity, this paper classifies bicycle riders into adventurous and conservative types, constructs a conflict evolution game model of inbound bus and bicycle with the objective of minimizing the loss of each of the bus driver and the bicycle rider through the conflict area, introduces prospect theory and conformity effect to optimize the model, and solves and analyzes the system's evolutionary results, and finally the key parameters of the model are analyzed for sensitivity using numerical simulation. The results of the study show that the traffic management department should formulate priority rules to guide the system to converge to an asymmetric integer solution; the evolutionary game model based on prospect theory considering the heterogeneity of cyclists and conformity effect is more in line with the actual traffic scenarios; the effects of conformity effect and the percentage of adventurous cyclists on the probability of bicyclists' passing are significant, and the setting of the bus priority right of way can effectively circumvent its influence on the decision-making of the bus driver effects; the dominance of each type of rider on the probability of bicyclist passing is not reflected in the percentage of people. This research result can provide theoretical basis and practical support for the development of traffic courtesy rules in the conflict area of bus stops.