碳限额与交易政策下电动汽车动力电池制造商梯次利用决策
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东北大学 工商管理学院,沈阳 110169

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E-mail: czhang@mail.neu.edu.cn.

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F274

基金项目:

国家社会科学基金项目(19GBL229).


Echelon utilization decision of an EV power battery manufacturer under carbon cap-and-trade policy
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School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China

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    摘要:

    随着我国电动汽车保有量迅速增长,大量退役动力电池亟需回收和利用.对此,研究碳限额与交易政策下电动汽车动力电池制造商开展梯次利用业务决策.针对由一个动力电池制造商、一个零售商和一个梯次利用商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建制造商不开展和开展梯次利用业务两种模式下闭环供应链模型.用Stackelberg博弈理论求得均衡解,通过理论比较和数值分析探究关键参数对最优决策和制造商模式选择的影响.研究发现,制造商最优碳减排水平随碳交易价格增加而增加,随碳减排成本系数增加而降低,随消费者低碳偏好系数增加而增加.制造商开展梯次利用业务并非总是最好选择,需满足以下条件:1)可梯次利用比例高于一定阈值;2)制造商为开展梯次业务而投入的成本小于一定阈值;3)制造商梯次利用单位收益高于一定阈值且梯次利用商梯次利用单位收益低于一定阈值.

    Abstract:

    The rapid growth of electric vehicles(EVs) in China has led to a critical need to recycle and utilize retired power batteries at a large scale. This paper studies the echelon utilization decision of EV power battery manufacturers under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. Two closed-loop supply chain models are constructed for the supply chain comprising a power battery manufacturer, retailer, and echelon utilization enterprise. These models differ based on whether the manufacturer is engaged in utilization business or not. The Stackelberg game theory is employed to solve the models, explore the impact of key parameters on the optimal decision, and conclude the manufacturer's mode selection through theoretical comparison and numerical analysis. The results show that the optimal carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer increases with the increase of carbon transaction price, and decreases with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and increases with the increase of consumer low-carbon preference coefficient. Establishing an echelon utilization business is not always the best strategy for the manufacturer. They need to meet the following conditions: 1) A higher proportion of echelon utilization; 2) A lower cost invested by the manufacturer to carry out the echelon operation; 3) A higher unit revenue of the manufacturer's echelon utilization with a lower unit revenue of the echelon utilization enterprise.

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张川,田雨鑫,李灿灿.碳限额与交易政策下电动汽车动力电池制造商梯次利用决策[J].控制与决策,2024,39(6):2051-2059

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-05-11
  • 出版日期: 2024-06-20
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