基于R&D溢出的集中研发联盟合作行为
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作者单位:

电子科技大学 经济与管理学院

作者简介:

熊麟

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中图分类号:

F016

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(700772068).


Partner’s cooperative behaviour in gathered R&D alliances based on R&D spillovers
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School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

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    摘要:

    研究了在联盟合作R&D中R&D溢出、R&D溢出的抑制能力以及创新能力对联盟成员的R&D投资策略的影响, 确定了联盟获得最大期望投入的最优分配方式. 研究表明: 1) R&D溢出和创新能力对联盟成员增加R&D投入有正效应; 企业抑制R&D溢出的力量对R&D投入有负效应, 但影响力很弱. 2) 对于创新能力强的联盟, 平均分配为最优分配方式; 对于创新能力弱的联盟, 市场规模低时选择按投入比例分配方式, 市场规模高时选择平均分配方式.

    Abstract:

    This paper studies on how members of alliance’s investment policies are influenced by R&D spillovers, control on own R&D spillovers and innovation ability, and determines the optimal allocation that the alliances obtain the maximum expected investment. This research shows following conclusions: 1) R&D spillovers and innovation ability have positive effects to increase members’ R&D investment, and control on own R&D spillovers has negative effects to members’ R&D investment, but its influence is weak. 2) The equal profit-sharing arrangement is the optimal profit-sharing arrangement to the alliances with strong innovation ability. For alliances with weak innovation ability, it should choose proportional profitsharing arrangement when market profits are low, and should choose equal profit-sharing arrangement when market gains are high.

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熊麟 鲁若愚.基于R&D溢出的集中研发联盟合作行为[J].控制与决策,2014,29(1):172-180

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历史
  • 收稿日期:2012-09-12
  • 最后修改日期:2013-03-27
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  • 在线发布日期: 2014-01-20
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