基于Stackelberg 博弈的供应链采购融资模式
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作者单位:

1. 浙江工商大学a. 工商管理学院,b. 金融学院,杭州310058;
2. 中共浙江省委党校,杭州310018.

作者简介:

包兴

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中图分类号:

C93

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(71002084, 71302033, 71302035);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY14G020001);浙江工商大学青年人才基金项目(QY13-10).


Supply chain financing with purchase-order based on Stackelberg game
Author:
Affiliation:

1a. School of Business Administration,1b. School of Finance,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310058, China;
2. Party School of The Zhejiang Committee of The CCP,Hangzhou 310018,China.

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    摘要:

    根据供应链采购融资的运作流程, 建立并分析基于Stackelberg 博弈的供应链融资模型. 通过数值分析博弈均衡解发现, 在供应商初始资金较小的情况下, 供应链采购融资能够较大幅度地提高供应链绩效; 融资产品的市场情况越好, 即价格或挽回价值越高, 供应链采购融资对于供应链的价值越大; 向市场风险较小的供应商提供采购融资能够使银行获得较大的绩效提高; 供应链采购融资是一种能够实现供应链成员双赢的供应链管理方法.

    Abstract:

    The operation process of supply chain purchase financing is analyzed. A Stackelberg game is used to model the financing decisions. Firstly, the game equilibrium is analyzed. Then the effect of supply chain purchases financing to the supply chain is considered. The results show that, when the initial budget of the supplier is relatively small, supply chain financing can greatly improve the supply chain performance. The higher the wholesale price and salvage value are, the more the value of the supply chain financing is. The bank can get more profits by supporting the supplier with purchaseorder financing in the low risk market scenarios. The results show that the supply chain purchase financing is a win-win mechanism.

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鲁其辉 曾利飞 包兴.基于Stackelberg 博弈的供应链采购融资模式[J].控制与决策,2014,29(10):1907-1913

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  • 收稿日期:2013-05-04
  • 最后修改日期:2014-01-08
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  • 在线发布日期: 2014-10-20
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