考虑零售商竞争的联合减排与低碳宣传微分对策
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作者:
作者单位:

天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072.

作者简介:

徐春秋

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

F272

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(71072155, 71202086).


Differential strategies of joint emission reductions and low-carbon promotion considering competing retailers
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Affiliation:

College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China.

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    摘要:

    借助微分博弈研究由单个制造商与两个零售商组成的供应链系统中长期联合减排和低碳宣传的问题. 在消费者需求受产品减排量和零售商低碳宣传努力影响的情况下, 构建了3 种微分博弈模型. 研究发现, 在一定条件下, 成本分担契约可以实现制造商和零售商利润的Pareto 改善, 而且处于稳定状态时, 随着竞争强度的增加, 制造商和整个供应链系统的利润逐渐上升, 零售商的利润逐渐下降. 最后, 通过算例对模型进行了分析.

    Abstract:

    With the aid of differential game, the long-term joint emission reductions and low-carbon promotion problems of the supply chain system consisted of a single manufacturer and two retailers are studied. In the case that the consumer demand is affected by emission reductions of products and the retailers’ low-carbon promotion, three differential game models are constructed. It is found that the cost-sharing contract can achieve Pareto improvement of manufacturers’ and retailers’ profits under certain conditions. With the increase of competition, the profits of the manufacturer and supply chain system increase while the retailers’ profits decrease. Finally, the model is analyzed through an example.

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引用本文

赵道致 徐春秋 王芹鹏.考虑零售商竞争的联合减排与低碳宣传微分对策[J].控制与决策,2014,29(10):1809-1815

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  • 收稿日期:2013-07-20
  • 最后修改日期:2013-11-18
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  • 在线发布日期: 2014-10-20
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