双重成本控制标准下企业收益分配信号博弈
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作者单位:

哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院, 哈尔滨150001.

作者简介:

孟凡生

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中图分类号:

F275.3

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(71072075);教育部博士点基金项目(20092304110017);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(G201135).


Game for enterprise income distribution signal under dual cost control standard
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School of Economics and Management,Harbin Engineering University,Harbin 150001,China.

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    摘要:

    按照双重成本控制标准对企业员工进行分类, 将企业和员工作为参与收益分配博弈的局中人, 认定他们在收益分配策略选择中均为理性人, 能够选择使自己利益最大化的策略. 根据企业在收益分配中具有的信息优势, 构建双重成本控制标准下的企业收益分配信号博弈模型, 提出博弈可能出现的4 种均衡结果和条件, 指出只有在员工确定其收益恰好等于预期, 且企业提供高支付方案时才会出现最有效率的分离均衡, 其他3 种结果都不是最有效率的均衡.

    Abstract:

    According to the dual cost control standard, the employees are classified, the enterprise and employees are treated as the players participating income distribution game, which are considered to be all rational people in the choice of income distribution strategies and can choose the strategies to make their own benefits maximization. On this basis of information advantages of the enterprise in the income distribution, the game model of enterprise income distribution signal under dual cost control standard is established, the possible four kinds of equilibrium results and conditions are proposed. It is pointed out that when employees ensure income is just equal to expectation and enterprise provides high payment scheme, the most efficiency separating equilibrium will appear, while other three results are not the most efficiency equilibrium.

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引用本文

孟凡生.双重成本控制标准下企业收益分配信号博弈[J].控制与决策,2015,30(4):764-768

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  • 收稿日期:2014-02-08
  • 最后修改日期:2014-04-18
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  • 在线发布日期: 2015-04-20
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