需求信息不对称下的双渠道供应链合作广告投资决策分析
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作者单位:

华南理工大学经济与贸易学院,广州510006.

作者简介:

纪静娜

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中图分类号:

F272

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(71101054, 71101055, 71572058);华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2015ZZ057).


Research on cooperative advertising decisions in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric demand information
Author:
Affiliation:

School of Economics and Commerce,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510006,China.

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    摘要:

    研究制造商主导的Stackelberg 博弈下双渠道供应链的合作广告策略, 分析信息不对称及双渠道对供应链合作广告投资决策的影响. 研究表明, 零售商在具有需求信息优势时会谎报需求信息, 并且在一定条件下其谎报决策会降低制造商的利润, 但能提高供应链的利润, 这种情况下制造商无法通过激励合同促使零售商共享信息. 另外, 在最优合作广告策略下, 当直销渠道与分销渠道所占市场份额的分配比例小于一定值时, 制造商采取双渠道会使供应链参与者均受益.

    Abstract:

    This paper analyzes the advertising decisions in a dual-channel supply chain involved one manufacturer and one retailer. A Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer is established. The influence of asymmetric demand information and dual-channel on the cooperative advertising decisions is analyzed. The study shows that the retailer will lie about the demand when it has demand information advantages. Under certain conditions, the optimal lied strategy would decrease manufacturer’s profit but increase the profit of the supply chain. Under such circumstances, the manufacturer could not use the incentive contract to encourage the retailer to share demand information. In addition, when the market share proportion between direct sales channel and distribution channel is less than a certain value, the introduction of direct sales channel can be beneficial to both the supply chain participants under optimal advertising strategies.

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引用本文

杨磊 纪静娜 张智勇.需求信息不对称下的双渠道供应链合作广告投资决策分析[J].控制与决策,2015,30(12):2285-2292

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历史
  • 收稿日期:2014-10-16
  • 最后修改日期:2015-01-23
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  • 在线发布日期: 2015-12-20
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