不同渠道权力结构下制造商回收闭环供应链绩效分析
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河北科技大学

作者简介:

李明芳

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F224

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河北省自然科学基金


Performance Analysis of Manufacturer Collecting Closed-loop Supply Chain under Different Channel Power Structures
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    摘要:

    针对制造商负责回收的闭环供应链决策问题,构建了集中决策供应链和三种渠道权力结构的分散决策供应链优化模型,探讨渠道权力结构对闭环供应链决策及绩效的影响作用。研究发现,三种渠道权力结构下的分散决策供应链都处于不协调状态,且不协调程度与渠道权力结构相关;存在领导权的Stackelberg供应链零售定价高于无领导权的Bertrand供应链,制造商领导零售定价高于零售商领导供应链;存在领导权供应链的回收比例低于无领导权供应链,制造商领导的回收比例低于零售商领导供应链;存在领导权供应链的系统利润低于无领导权供应链,制造商领导的系统利润低于零售商领导供应链;供应链企业利润在其自身领导系统中最高,势均力敌系统中次之,对方领导系统中最低。

    Abstract:

    In order to explore the effect of channel power structure on the decisions and performance of manufacturer collecting closed-loop supply chain, the centralized decision-making supply chain and three decentralized supply chains with different channel power structure have been analyzed. The study found that decentralized supply chains are not coordinated, and the uncoordinated degree is associated with the channel power structure. The retail price in Stackelberg structure is higher than Bertrand structure, and it in Manufacturer- Stackelberg (MS) structure is higher than Retailer- Stackelberg (RS) structure. The recycling proportion in Stackelberg structure is lower than Bertrand structure, and it in MS structure is lower than RS structure. The system profit in Stackelberg structure is lower than Bertrand structure, and it in MS structure is lower than RS structure. For each member enterprise, his profit is highest in himself leadership Stackelberg structure, and lowest in the other’s leadership Stackelberg structure.

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李明芳.不同渠道权力结构下制造商回收闭环供应链绩效分析[J].控制与决策,2016,31(11):2095-2100

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  • 收稿日期:2015-09-10
  • 最后修改日期:2016-01-18
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  • 在线发布日期: 2016-11-20
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