This article mainly discusses the selection of incentive contracts of hardware platforms in the competitive environment, aiming to study the performance of the three tariff contracts and traditional access fee contracts of hardware platforms in the competitive environment, and identify the dynamic evolution of the competition model of hardware platform incentive contracts, and analyzes the final market equilibrium. First of all, this paper establishes a hardware platform competition game model, and studies the game equilibrium and performance in the three cases in which both platforms provide the traditional access fee contracts, both provide the three tariff contracts, and provide the three tariff contracts and traditional access fee contracts respectively. Then, it compares the profits of hardware vendors and software vendors in the above three cases, and analyzes the different performance of the three tariff contracts and the traditional access fee contracts. Finally, from the perspective of hardware vendors and software vendors achieving Pareto improvement at the same time, the evolution process of the incentive contract game of competitive hardware platforms is identified and the final game equilibrium is analyzed. The results show that the hardware platform competition game will eventually converge to a Nash equilibrium in which both hardware vendors use incentive contracts, which in some cases will instead make each platform fall into the prisoner’s dilemma of profit.