The pricing decision problems for closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility(CSR) under different power structures are studied. The optimal CSR apportionment mechanism and pricing strategy of member enterprises under Stackelberg game and Nash noncooperative game are discussed. The effect of member enterprises’ CSR behavior to the pricing of new products and the recycling of waste products are analyzed. It shows that no matter under what power structures, the CSR behavior of member enterprise is conducive to expanding the market demand of new products and improving the return rate of waste products, and is also conducive to maximizing the social welfare of retailer, manufacturer and the whole closed-loop supply chain system. By comparing the optimal equilibrium results under the three power structures. the recycling effect of waste products is best under the dominant retailer power structure. And in the Nash noncooperative game, the new product has the lowest retail price and the highest market demand. Finally, the total benefits that the retailer and manufacturer obtain when pursuiting maximization of social welfare are the largest under their own dominant channel structure.