Considering the concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR) along with government intervention of remanufacturing industry in China, the game between manufacturers and remanufacturers is investigated using a closed-loop supply chain dynamic game model. The recovery effort, the purchase amount of end-of-life products, and product output of channel members are defined as decision elements in the model for three scenarios, including independent recovery without government intervention, government-regulated recovery contingent on reward-penalty measures, and government-regulated recovery dependent upon fund coordination.Equilibrium solutions of the members are approximated in three contexts, respectively, to expound how government regulation and fund coordination affect corporate strategies and environmental performance.The results indicate that the recovery strategy of the manufacturer is most relevant to the transfer payment of end-of-life products, government regulations contingent on reward-penalty measures facilitates the progress of recycling and remanufacturing operations, and fund coordination in some extent stirs production capacity enhancement of the remanufacturer and promotes specialization however lacks practicability for the well-developed remanufacturing industry. The results are concluded of significant references for corporates in remanufacturing strategy selections and government in environmental regulation design based on the EPR system.