This paper studies a dual channel supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. Based on whether the supply chain partners adopt radio frequency identification(RFID), we accordingly set up the partners’ profit models under four scenarios: none of the partners adopts RFID(NN), only the manufacturer adopts RFID(AN), only the retailer adopts RFID(NA), and both of the partners adopt RFID(AA). We obtain the both of the partners’ optimal decision-variables and profits. Furthermore, we discuss the equilibrium strategies of RFID adoption in the dual-channel supply chain. The study shows that the equilibrium strategies of RFID adoption in the dual-channel supply chain depend on competition intensity, revenue-sharing coefficient and RFID tagging cost. The supply chain partners tend to adopt RFID with a low competition intensity, while only the retailer is inclined to adopt RFID with a high competition intensity. AA cannot be an equilibrium strategy with a high revenue-sharing coefficient, otherwise, AA is the equilibrium strategy if the manufacturer adopts RFID. The supply chain partners tend to adopt RFID with a low tagging cost while not to adopt RFID otherwise.