The precision of a firms' targeted coupon has a greater impact on the coupon value and firms' profit. Aiming at the problem of precise distribution of targeted coupon, this paper uses game theory to study the impact of targeting ability on the coupon value and firms' profit in the duopoly competition environment. Furthermore, the paper introduces targeting ability as a decision variable into the model for further research. The results show that when the targeting ability reaches a certain threshold, the firm will implement a high price strategy in the loyal market and a low price strategy in the competitive market. The targeting ability plays a bidirectional role in the regulation of a firms' profit. That is when the targeting ability is within the range of threshold, the improvement of targeting ability will bring higher profit. However, the improvement of targeting ability will reduce the profit if beyond the threshold. When the investment cost coefficient of targeting ability is quite high, the firm with more loyal customers tends to improve the targeting ability. Conversely, both firms will improve the targeting ability to increase firms' profit.