产品质量信息不对称时基于信号博弈的期权预售策略
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作者:
作者单位:

1.莆田学院;2.厦门大学;3.诺丁汉大学

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中图分类号:

F272.3

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目)(71571151, 71871197, 71872158);莆田学院引进人才科研启动项目(2021080)


Option pricing in advance selling to signal quality
Author:
Affiliation:

1.Putian University;2.Nottingham University

Fund Project:

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (General Program)(71571151, 71871197, 71872158); the Talents Start-up Foundation of Putian University (2021080)

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    摘要:

    预售期到达的策略消费者与制造商之间产品质量信息不对称,制造商可以通过不同的预售策略和预售价格设置,影响消费者对产品质量的判断和购买时机的选择。基于信号传递博弈理论,构建了产品质量信息对称和不对称时的博弈模型,给出了质量信息不对称时制造商实现分离均衡和混同均衡的边界条件。结果表明,制造商产能较大时,期权预售本身可以作为高产品质量制造商的信号传递工具;消费者判断产品质量为高质量的先验概率足够大时,高产品质量制造商倾向于实现混同均衡隐藏质量信息,反之倾向于实现分离均衡,通过较高的行权价格传递质量信息。并进一步探讨了预售期时长导致的消费者等待成本的影响,结果发现等待成本相对较低时,上述结论依然成立。

    Abstract:

    We consider a manufacturer who has private information about product quality but the strategic customers who arrive in the advance period are unknown the quality information, the manufacturer could influence consumers' judgment of product quality and chosen of purchasing time through different advance selling strategies and prices. Based on the signaling game theory, we construct the game models when quality information is symmetric and asymmetric, and get the existence conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. We find that the option advance selling strategy is an effective tool to signal product quality when manufacturer's capacity is larger, and high product quality manufacturer tries to hide its quality information by pooling equilibrium when the prior probability about high product quality of customers is high enough, otherwise the manufacturer will reveal its quality information though higher option execution price and separating equilibrium.Furthermore, we discuss the influence of the waiting cost of customers who purchase in the advance selling period, and find that preceding conclusions still hold when the waiting cost is relatively low.

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历史
  • 收稿日期:2021-11-05
  • 最后修改日期:2022-03-30
  • 录用日期:2022-04-08
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