This paper introduces a personal decision tree and a social network to study the individual's strategy in the interest struggle, and explores how the individual's expected return is affected by the second decision in the rights protection, and analyzes how the individual's social network link affects the group strategy result. The results show that in the case of failure to defend rights according to law, if the cost of pro-group behavior is large or the success rate of the behavior is small, it is not appropriate to adopt pro-group behavior; Conversely, pro-group behavior can be adopted in the second decision-making. Further, under the corresponding conditions, the individual may actively contact other individuals to participate in the rights protection or accept the invitation to participate in the group rights protection under the social network. Regardless of whether the individual participates in the pro-group behavior, the personal desire and the group strategy selection are separated, resulting in the equilibrium separation of individuals between the individual strategy and the group strategy. Therefore, under the social network, the higher the interest you want to fight, the easier it is to organize group, and the higher the cost is, the less likely it is to organize group for the rights protection. Finally, the hardcover room case is used to verify the effectiveness of the research results, and corresponding policy recommendations are provided.