This paper presents a model of duopolistic competition in terms of both environmental quality and price, which investigates the impact of the green network effect(GNE) considering consumer environmental awareness(CEA) and government financial policies combining of pollution tax and recovery subsidy, with the objective of profit maximization for the remanufacturing firms. Numerical results reveal that a higher(resp. lower) GNE coefficient of a high-quality product may abnormally reduce(resp. increase) both the environmental quality and price of products but raise(resp. shrink) the consumption and profit of the high-quality(resp. low-quality) product, although product differentiation is not impacted by it. Moreover, the increase of recovery subsidy allows for better(resp. worse) market demand and profit for the high-quality(resp. low-quality) product in the presence of positive GNE compared to that in the absence of GNE. However, under best optimum, the regulator can always maximize the “economic surplus” consisting of firm's profits and consumer's surplus and minimize the amount of emissions.