Based on the two-sided market theory, this paper studies the pricing strategy of the monopolistic manufacturing capacity sharing platform, considering the network externality of the two-sided market and the sensitivity of the demand side to the processing delivery and price. Firstly, a two-stage decision-making model of platform and bilateral users is established, and the platform equilibrium profit under registration fee and transaction fee charging model is explored through calculation and solution, and the influence of exogenous variables such as the externality of cross network on the decision-making and platform profit of all parties is analyzed. The results show that the platform equilibrium profit under registration fee mode is greater than that under fixed transaction fee mode. Platform profits under the two pricing models are positively correlated with the network externalities of bilateral users, negatively correlated with the expected deviation of delivery date of the demand side of capacity, and positively correlated with the expected price of capacity. When the actual delivery date is earlier or later than the expected delivery date, the sensitivity of the demand side has different influences on the platform profit. When the actual price of the demand side is lower or higher than the expected price, the sensitivity of the demand side has different influences on the platform profit.