This paper considers a two-stage supply chain with two competitive or complementary manufacturers and a dominant retailer, who has an inventory misplacement problem. Based on whether the two manufacturers adopt RFID technology, we establish four revenue models and derive two manufacturers' optimal wholesale prices and RFID cost-sharing coefficient in each scenario, as well as the retailer's optimal retail prices or order quantities under the retailer’s pricing or ordering decision. We obtain the supply chain players’ optimal revenues and explore the equilibrium strategies for RFID adoption of the competitive or complementary manufacturers. We find that the retailer choosing the pricing decision can promote the manufacturers to adopt RFID technology compared with choosing the ordering decision. Moreover, when the retailer chooses the pricing decision, the higher the influence coefficient between the two products is, the more likely the two manufacturers are to adopt RFID technology. Furthermore, when the RFID cost or the misplacement rate is in a certain range, if the retailer chooses the pricing (ordering) decision and sells competitive (complementary) products, the retailer can obtain a higher revenue if the manufacturers adopt RFID technology.