We consider a manufacturer who has private information about product quality but the strategic customers who arrive in the advance period are unknown the quality information, the manufacturer could influence consumers' judgment of product quality and chosen of purchasing time through different advance selling strategies and prices. Based on the signaling game theory, we construct the game models when quality information is symmetric and asymmetric, and get the existence conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. We find that the option advance selling strategy is an effective tool to signal product quality when manufacturer's capacity is larger, and the high product quality manufacturer tries to hide its quality information by pooling equilibrium when the prior probability about high product quality of customers is high enough, otherwise the manufacturer will reveal its quality information though higher option execution price and separating equilibrium. Finally, we further discuss the influence of the waiting cost of customers who purchase in the advance selling period, and it is found that preceding conclusions still hold when the waiting cost is relatively low.