Since fierce competition is increasing among enterprises, whether to efficiently empower upstream and downstream enterprises through revenue allocation in the supply chain with multiple enterprises closely linked has become the key for decision-makers to leverage synergistic advantages and gather innovative synergy. Based on the disappointment theory, this study uses the differential game method to explore the strategy of dynamic optimization and coordination of collaborative product innovation in the supply chain.Product innovation R&D goodwill and disappointment avoidance factors are incorporated into the decision-making behavior.On this basis, the product innovation subsidy contract and the revenue matching regulation mechanism are proposed.The simulation results are analyzed in the last step.The results show that the greater the disappointment avoidance coefficient is, the lower the target profit of supply chain members is. Under certain conditions, the design and implementation of subsidy contract for innovation and R&D-promotion can effectively improve the research and development and publicity level, optimal revenue, and overall supply chain revenue of the subsidized party, while the research and development effort level of the subsidized party remains unchanged. Restricting the income distribution ratio of supply chain members to a certain range can effectively improve the present value of supply chain members' utility and realize Pareto optimization under supply chain coordination.