基于量子反应均衡的政府与共享单车企业停车管理博弈分析
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作者单位:

1. 北京交通大学 交通运输学院,北京 100044;2. 北京交通大学 综合交通运输大数据应用技术 交通运输行业重点实验室,北京 100044;3. 北京交通大学 中国综合交通研究中心,北京 100044

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E-mail: shpjia@bjtu.edu.cn.

中图分类号:

U-121

基金项目:

中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2022YJS061);国家自然科学基金项目(71971021).


Game analysis of parking management between government and bike-sharing enterprises based on quantal response equilibrium
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Affiliation:

1. School of Traffic and Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;2. Key Laboratory of Transport Industry of Big Data Application Technologies for Comprehensive Transport of Ministry of Transport,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;3. Integrated Transport Research Center of China,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China

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    摘要:

    共享单车停车问题是城市交通治理中最主要的问题之一,其表面为共享单车用户停车行为不规范、共享单车企业管理调度不及时所致,究其本质实为共享单车各利益主体缺乏有效协同治理机制、停车权责划分不清晰、成本分担失衡的结果.考虑政府与共享单车企业的有限理性,建立扩展式博弈的量子反应均衡(QRE)模型分析双方停车管理博弈机理,并利用Gambit软件进行算例仿真分析.研究表明:双方博弈结果随理性程度增加逐渐趋向于基于完全理性的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,政府掌握更多企业运营信息有利于达到社会效用最大化的博弈结果;政府引入有效处罚措施或主导负责停车管理可以降低自身的财政支出和社会总成本,建立量化的处罚标准能够促进企业主动承担停车管理责任;有限理性程度、违停数量、激励机制和科技手段运行效率会影响企业的停车管理策略选择.

    Abstract:

    Shared bicycles parking is one of the most important problems in urban transportation management. On the surface, it is caused by the irregular parking behavior of shared bicycles users and the untimely management and dispatching of operating enterprises. In essence, it is the result of the lack of effective collaborative governance mechanism, the unclear division of parking rights and responsibilities, the imbalance of cost sharing among the stakeholders of shared bicycles. Considering the bounded rationality of the government and bike-sharing enterprises, this study establishes an quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model for extensive form games to analyze the parking management game mechanism, and uses Gambit to simulate and analyze a numerical example. The research indicates that game results of two players gradually tend to the subgame-perfect equilibrium based on complete rationality with the increase of the degree of rationality. The government's grasp of more information about the operation of enterprises will help to achieve the game result of maximizing social utility. The government can reduce its own financial expenditure and total social cost by introducing effective punishment measures or taking charge of parking management. Quantifying the punishment standard can promote bike-sharing enterprises to take responsibility for parking management. In addition, the factors including the degree of bounded rationality, the number of illegal parking, operation efficiency of incentive mechanism and technological methods will affect the behaviour strategy of parking management.

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张书婧,贾顺平,彭芃,等.基于量子反应均衡的政府与共享单车企业停车管理博弈分析[J].控制与决策,2024,39(2):641-648

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-01-18
  • 出版日期: 2024-02-20
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