To address the problems caused by the entry of counterfeiters into the market, such as the difficulty in guaranteeing consumers' rights and interests, the market share of genuine manufacturers being taken away, and the disruption of normal market order, we establish two sales models of genuines manufacturer reselling through retailers or selling directly through own channels. The Stackelberg game is used to compare the equilibrium results of the two sales models and analyze the optimal sales model selection strategy. We also explore the combating effect on the two counterfeiters and the impact on consumer surplus and social welfare. The results show that genuine manufacturers may not choose the direct sales model to protect consumer interests. The incentive for genuine manufacturers to choose the direct sales model decreases along with the consumers' perceived quality of genuine and deceptive counterfeits in the resale model and the quality of deceptive counterfeits, and increases with the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits; the direct sales strategy of genuines manufacturer is always effective against non-deceptive counterfeiters. However, genuine manufacturers will choose the resale model and tolerate deceptive counterfeiters under certain conditions. The genuine manufacturers' direct sales strategy can increase consumer surplus and social welfare.