常时滞下n人随机演化布尔博弈的策略一致
CSTR:
作者:
作者单位:

山东师范大学

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

O231

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)


Strategy consensus of n-person random evolutionary Boolean games with time delay
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (General Program, Key Program, Major Research Plan)

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    本文研究常时滞下 n 人随机演化布尔博弈的策略一致问题. 首先, 构建了常时滞下 n 人随机演化布尔博弈的数学模型, 并利用矩阵半张量积得到其代数形式. 其次, 基于随机可达集与控制不变子集, 将常时滞下 n 人随机演化布尔博弈的策略一致问题转化为等价系统的集合镇定问题, 并给出其实现以概率 1 策略一致的充要条件. 进一步, 通过设计状态反馈控制器来实现常时滞下 n 人随机演化布尔博弈的策略一致. 最后, 在文章末给出一个算例来验证所得理论结果的有效性.

    Abstract:

    This paper is concerned with the strategy consensus of n-person random evolutionary Boolean games with time delay (REBGTD). To begin with, we present the model of n-person REBGTD and derive its algebraic form via the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices. Subsequently, based on a series of stochastic reachable sets and control invariant subsets, the strategy consensus problem of n-person REBGTD is transformed into the set stabilization problem of equivalent systems, and a necessary and sufficient condition is proposed for the strategy consensus with probability one of n-person REBGTD. Moreover, the state feedback controllers are designed to realize the strategy consensus of n-person REBGTD. Finally, to validate the theoretical results, an illustrative example is presented at the end of the paper.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文
相关视频

分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:2026-05-27
  • 最后修改日期:2026-08-31
  • 录用日期:2026-09-02
  • 在线发布日期: 2026-09-16
  • 出版日期:
文章二维码