KZYJC控制与决策Control and Decision1001-0920控制与决策编辑部中国沈阳kzyjc-326-6-148910.13195/j.kzyjc.2019.1328F253A论文与报告Papers and Reports不同担保模式下考虑零售商公平关切的闭环供应链博弈模型Game models of closed-loop supply chain under different warranty modes considering retailer's fairness concerns马晓平MAXiao-ping
In a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, we construct the decision-making game model by considering fairness concerns under different warranty modes. The impact of warranty modes and retailer's fairness concerns on CLSC pricing and warranty period decisions as well as the economic and environmental benefit is discussed, and the warranty efficiency of different warranty models is analyzed. The results show that when consumers are more sensitive to different warranty periods between new and remanufactured products, manufacturers or retailers will provide long-term warranty services for remanufactured products; retailers' fairness concerns will reduce the wholesale prices of both the new and remanufactured products; the impact of the fairness concerns on the sale price and warranty period of remanufactured products and the economic and environmental benefits of the supply chain are closely related to different product warranty modes. The economic and environmental benefits of the two warranty modes are contingent on the warranty costs and the relative environmental advantages of the remanufactured products. When the relative cost advantage of retailer warranty and the relative environmental advantage of remanufactured products are significant (weak), the retailer (manufacturer) warranty mode is the consistent decision made by stakeholders in the CLSC. The retailer warranty model can reduce the negative impact of retailer's fairness concerns on the economic and environmental benefits of the CLSC.
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